Inna organizacja drużyny

[bolas]

Raz, dwa, trzy ... ;)

Swoją drogą w szturmie nie chodzi o zabicie wszystkich przecinikow, tylko o ich wyeliniowanie i zlamanie oporu. Po ciosie w pysk" łopatką zapewne większość ludzi będzie chwilowo spacyfikowana.

[bolas]

Oczywiście jak ktoś nie lubi łopatki można kogoś zatłuc łopatą saperską ... ;)

Finalnie - jestem za automatem - to że ma przewagę nad powtarzalnym kb widać dziś. Wszyscy wykorzystują broń automatyczną do walki, a nie karabin powtarzalny z bagnetem. Sam bagnet też powoli odchodzido lamusa - wiele armii już z niego przecież rezygnuje.

Wybaczcię ten ekskurs łopatkowy :))))))))

[bolas]

Wracając do tematu, znalazłem nieco informacji o Angolach ;)


-------------------------------------------------
The Infantry Battalion, circa 1941 to 1942
Battalion Headquarters (5 Officers, 50 men)
Headquarter Company (8 Officers, 247 men) comprised of;
Company HQ (1 Officer, 7 men)
Signals Platoon (1 Officer, 35 men)
Anti Aircraft Platoon (20 men)
Mortar Platoon (1 Officer, 45 men)
Carrier Platoon (2 Officers, 62 men)
Pioneer Platoon (1 Officer, 21 men)
Administrative Platoon (2 Officers, 57 men)

Four Rifle Companies (5 Officers, 119 men), each comprised of;

Company HQ (2 Officers, 11 men)
Three Rifle Platoons, each comprised of;
Platoon HQ (1 Officer, 6 men)
Three Rifle Sections, each comprised of 10 men

Total Strength of 806 all ranks (33 Officers and 773 men)

The Infantry Battalion, circa 1943 to 1945

Battalion Headquarters (5 Officers, 45 men)
Headquarter Company (4 Officers, 91 men)
Company HQ (1 Officer, 5 men)
Signals Platoon (1 Officer, 35 men)
Administrative Platoon (2 Officers, 51 men) * increased by 1 man, November 1944
Support Company (7 Officers, 185 men)
Company HQ (1 Officer, 8 men) * reduced by 1 man, November 1944
Mortar Platoon (1 Officer, 42 men)
Carrier Platoon (2 Officers, 61 men)
Anti-tank Platoon (2 Officers, 53 men)
Pioneer Platoon (1 Officer, 21 men)

Four Rifle Companies (5 Officers, 122 men), each comprised of;
Company HQ (2 Officers, 14 men)

Three Rifle Platoons, each comprised of;
Platoon HQ (1 Officer, 3 men)
Light Mortar Section (3 men)
Three Rifle Sections, each comprised of 10 men

Total Strength of 845 all ranks (35 Officers and 809 men)
----------------------------------------

Nieco informacji o kompanii strzeleckiej:
Wrzucam po angielsku - mam nadzieję że dacie radę ...

----------------------------------------

The Rifle Company - the ultimate staying power of the Battalion was provided by its four Rifle Companies (A to D), which changed little during the conflict. The foundation of the Company was the Rifle Section of ten men.

The Section was commanded by a Corporal, and comprised a rifle group of six men, and a gun group with a Lance Corporal, gunner and loader. The Corporal began the war with a rifle, but this was replaced first by the US supplied Thompson, and latterly by the home grown Sten. The 'Tommy Gun' was a heavy, complicated weapon, but packed the punch of .45 cal ammunition. By comparison, the Sten was a cheap, nasty and initially unreliable item, but fired more controllable 9 mm ammunition. It was, however, simple to produce and maintain, and eventually almost supplanted the Thompson in frontline service. The six men of the rifle group were each armed with the bolt action Short Magazine, Lee Enfield, which remained the standard rifle of the Army throughout. The 'Rifle No.4' was an incredibly reliable and accurate weapon, and fired the powerful .303 inch round. However, it was handicapped by its bolt action system which, while by no means unique, sorely slowed the rate of fire a rifleman could produce - especially by comparison with his US contemporary. The British Army never fielded a home produced semi-automatic rifle during the war, and the SMLE was still in service in 1956 when it was replaced by a British version of the Belgian FN FAL. The gun group served the Section's single Bren light machine gun. The Bren was a superb weapon, and it provided the section with its base of firepower. It was vital to maintain the weapon, no matter the cost, as without it the riflemen alone could not defeat a determined assault. If the gunner fell, another man would take his place, and again another. The Lance Corporal and loader each carried a rifle, the gunner the Bren; unlike other armies he was not provided with a pistol as a sidearm. Intriguingly though, he was on paper at least still provided with a rifle up until 1943, though there is no evidence to suggest he ever carried both weapons in combat.

In action, the gun group would lay suppressive fire to allow the riflemen to manoeuvre. As in other such sections, the weakness lay in the moment when the gun group had to up and move to catch the riflemen. The rifle group could not match the volume of fire with their bolt action weapons, and so could not equal the job done by the exposed Bren crew. The Corporal would try to guide the actions of his men, and lead in the close assault with his submachine gun. Overall the Section was workmanlike. The rifle group was large enough to sustain casualties and still operate effectively, and its mix of weapons was mostly adequate. It was not particularly suited to street fighting, the immediate nature of encounters requiring a higher portion of automatic weapons which could only be provided by increasing the issue of Sten guns on a local basis.

The Rifle Platoon was comprised of three such Sections under a HQ. The Platoon commander, a 1st or 2nd Lieutenant (known as a Subaltern), was aided by a Sergeant and two men. One, the officer's batman, served initially as a runner until the availability of radios permitted each platoon to carry a set, and then he became a signaller. The second man maintained his role as a runner, carrying messages to the Rifle Sections who had no radios. The officer carried the traditional revolver, but it was not uncommon for a rifle to be adopted until the Sten offered a more attractive alternative. Apparently, this was often obtained by 'swapping' the pistol with the 2 inch mortar gunner, but by 1944 Rifle Platoon Commanders were provided with their own Sten guns. The Sergeant, who in the absence or loss of the officer became platoon leader, and both men all carried rifles. The Platoon included its own 15cwt truck in the 1941/42 organisation, with a rifle armed driver in charge, to transport weapons and equipment.

Originally, two men served the platoon's single 2 inch mortar, augmented by a Lance Corporal in the 1943 reorganisation.. This odd little weapon had its equals in both the German and Russian armies, but both quickly discarded their versions. In British service though, the weapon endured. It could project small rounds up to 500 yards, but the effect of their charge was negligible. More useful were its smoke rounds, of which more were normally carried than explosive. It was pretty much a mutated grenade launcher, but in the hands of some madmen it was known to be fired horizontally, braced against some object, like a massive shotgun. Quite useful for street fighting. Its crewmen men carried rifles until the gunner replaced his weapon with a lighter Sten gun mid-war.

The three Platoons served under a Company HQ, which provided admin and communications facilities, but no overt fire support other than two snipers. These men were added during 1943, and initially served as part of the Company. During 1944, the Battalion's eight snipers were withdrawn from the Companies and located into a Section at Battalion HQ. This was a largely administrative exercise, but allowed a Sergeant, Corporal and two Lance-Corporals to be promoted within their ranks.

The Company was commanded by a Major or Captain, with a Captain or Lieutenant as his second. In 1941/42, there would be two trucks at HQ for transportation. When the Rifle Platoons lost their individual trucks in 1943, Company transport became three 15cwt trucks and one Jeep, all under HQ control. Also at this time a Universal Carrier was added, with a Bren and 2 inch mortar on board. Company HQ also administered the infantry anti-tank weapons. Three were provided, initially the Boys Anti-tank Rifle, and from 1942/43 the Projector, Infantry, Anti-tank (PIAT). The Boys was a throwback to World War One, when large calibre rifles could penetrate tank armour. This was a nonsense by 1939, and the Boys was more an encumbrance than a weapon, its .55 inch round ineffective against all but armoured cars and soft skins. The PIAT was an oddity, but an improvement. It 'threw' its bomb by a combination of a powerful spring and propellant charge. It was difficult to aim, and like the American Bazooka it was largely outclassed by German tanks, but it gave some chance of killing a panzer to the lowly rifleman. The absence of any back blast made it an ideal weapon in street fighting, a task which the men were heavily engaged in throughout Europe. There was no officially recognised standing crew for these weapons, so either the men at Platoon HQ had to regroup themselves, or a Section was lumbered with the extra weapon and ammunition.
---------------------------------

[bolas]

To teraz Niemiaszki dla odmiany:

-------------------------------
NIEMIECKA KOMPANIA STRZELECKA
-------------------------------
The Rifle Company - the original Company formation fielded by the Infantry was particularly large. The building block was the Rifle Squad or Gruppe.

Each Squad was comprised of an NCO, a six man rifle element and a three man light machine gun team. The NCO was originally armed with a rifle, but as sufficient stocks became available adopted the MP40 machine pistol. The MP40 was the world's first mass produced submachine gun, and was constructed from pre-fabricated metal stampings and plastic. It fired the usual 9 mm round, and became a highly sought after allied trophy. Some one million were eventually produced. The men of the rifle group were all armed with the Mauser bolt action rifle, an amended model of the 1898 weapon fielded during the Great War. One of the riflemen served as assistant leader. Like the British, the Germans based the firepower of the squad around a single light machine gun. The MG34 was served by a gunner and loader, each man armed with a pistol; a third ammunition bearer carried a rifle. The original weapon was the revolutionary MG34. The Germans believed a gunner would only have seconds to engage exposed enemy infantry before they naturally took cover. The MG34 had an exceptionally high rate of fire for the period, enabling even the shortest burst to unleash a tremendous volley.

The German penchant for large headquarters elements began at Platoon level. The four squads were directed by a Platoon commander aided by an NCO, three runners and a supply wagon driver. The commander was armed with a machine pistol and a semi-automatic pistol, while the NCO was unusually authorised a pistol. The three runners carried rifles, as did the wagon driver. One of the runners was the first to be equipped with a telescopic sight for his rifle. The wagon driver was responsible for the Platoon supply vehicle, a horse drawn affair which transported the bulk of the unit's equipment. The Company Train included four stretcher bearers armed with pistols, one being routinely attached to each Platoon. The Light Mortar Section was the same as the British equivalent, an NCO with gunner and loader. The NCO carried a rifle, each crewman a pistol. The 5 cm light mortar was not a popular weapon. Unlike the British, who used the 2 inch mortar more for smoke than effect, the Germans intended the 5 cm to bridge the gap between maximum grenade range and minimum safe artillery range. It was not a success, being too heavy a weapon for too small an advantage. It fell out of use quickly once the campaign in the East began. During 1942 each Squad received a rifle grenade launcher, used to propel a variety of high explosive and more often antitank rounds, providing a much more flexible weapon.

Company HQ provided the usual command functions. The supply role was handled by the substantial Company Train, which included a large number of horse drawn vehicles plus a 2 ton truck. Company level fire support was provided by the Antitank Rifle Section. Its NCO commanded three teams, each of a gunner and loader serving a single Panzerbuchse 38/39. The antitank rifle was, as mentioned in the British pages, an outmoded idea from a previous era. The ironic reality was that many Infantry units did not even have the rifles until the invasion of Russia, in which theatre of war they were infinitely outclassed. But, as in the British and Red armies, they remained in use long after they should have to provide the infantry soldier with some means to engage armour in the absence of the necessary towed guns.

The Rifle Company - the new Company was a much smaller unit. The Rifle Squad itself was now targeted for 'downsizing', losing the ammunition bearer for the machine gun team. The loader now officially adopted a rifle, and a second machine pistol replaced a Mauser in the rifle group, possibly carried by the assistant leader. Platoon HQ now had a commander, two runners, a medic, and two supply wagon drivers. Each Platoon now had a two horse wagon, and a one horse wagon with trailer. The commander still carried his MP40 and pistol, the medic a pistol, all others rifles. The Platoon also had two unallocated light machine gun for deployment as required, but this was swiftly reduced to one and it too may have been deleted in subsequent cutbacks. Curiously, there is no indication of radios being issued to Platoons. Instead, Company HQ listed four signallers among it strength, who were perhaps despatched as necessary. The Company Train carried a further light machine gun.

With the demise of the 5 cm mortar and the antitank rifle, fire support was provided initially by two 8 cm mortars, which were subsequently withdrawn and replaced by two heavy machine guns. In both cases the weapons involved were simply redeployed from the Machine Gun or Heavy Company.

A number of new individual weapons began to reach the troops in 1943, and the new Rifle Company organisation attempted to incorporate them. It was intended the Company would receive nineteen self loading rifles, ten of which would be fitted with telescopic sights. There was no specific guidance on how these weapons were to be allocated, but two per Squad, one scoped, would seem reasonable. Given the often incoherent nature of the German supply system it would be sensible to regard this more as the ideal situation than the actual in many cases. The Gewehr 43 was an attempt to provide a semi automatic rifle to the troops, but still using the same ammunition as the Mauser. It had been preceded by the Gewehr 41, which had proven to be an all round failure in terms of usefulness and reliability. The much modified rifle was a success, and while it never replaced the 1898 Mauser, it offered a real increase in firepower to those units lucky enough to receive it. Likewise, the MG42 served alongside the MG34 as the Squad light machine gun, its high rate of fire proving as devastating in the light role as the heavy. Antitank potential had also been exponentially increased. For the best part of two years, the German soldiers only reply to a Soviet T34 was to move within spitting distance and assail it with either a Teller mine or a bundle of stick grenades. A new series of one shot disposable antitank grenades changed that in late 1943. The variously titled Faustpatrone or Panzerfaust gave the individual soldier the ability to successfully destroy a tank, though effective range never increased beyond 100 m as the design was progressively upgraded. Unlike the Bazooka or PIAT, the Panzerfaust was effectively a munition, and was issued in tremendous numbers to offset the declining status of the Panzer arm.

One new weapon deserves special mention, for it was to set the course of rifle development for the next fifty years. The Sturmgewher 44, also known as the MP43, MP44 and Stg45, used an entirely different round to the Mauser. It was designed only for short ranges of up to perhaps 500 m, which allowed the weapon to fire on fully automatic while retaining controllability. It was fed from a thirty round magazine. The rifle was never produced in sufficient quantities to effect the revolution in squad tactics it promised; that was left to the post war Kalashnikov which it inspired. However, the German Army did issue a revised Company organisation to embrace the new weapon.

The first and second Platoons were almost entirely rearmed with the Stg44. The first and second Squads in each Platoon were fully equipped, while the third Squad deployed two MG42s. Platoon commander and runners carried the weapon, the rest of HQ remained as before. An additional MG42 was also issued at Platoon. The third Platoon was armed as previously, but without the extra light machine gun. Company HQ deployed a sniper group of six or seven men, and the Train was abolished. Quite how many units were able to field this ideal is purely speculative, but perhaps only 100,000 assault rifles were ever available.
-------------------------------

The Infantry Battalion, circa 1939 to 1940
Battalion Headquarters (5 Officers, 15 men)
Communications Platoon (19 men)
Battalion Supply Train (2 Officers, 32 men)
Machine Gun Company (4 Officers, 173 men)
Company HQ (1 Officer, 20 men)
Company Train (14 men)
Mortar Platoon (1 Officer, 67 men)

Two Machine Gun Platoons, each (1 Officer, 36 men)
Three Rifle Companies (4 Officers, 186 men), each comprised of;
Company HQ (1 Officer, 11 men)
Company Supply Train (24 men)
Machine Gun Section (16 men)
Three Rifle Platoons, each comprised of;
Platoon HQ (1 Officer, 3 men)
Light Mortar Section (3 men)
Three Rifle Squads, each comprised of 13 men

Total Strength of 820 all ranks (23 Officers and 797 men)

------------------------
The Infantry Battalion, circa 1941 to 1942
Battalion Headquarters (5 Officers, 27 men)
Communications Platoon (22 men)
Battalion Supply Train (32 men)
Machine Gun Company (5 Officers, 197 men)
Company HQ (1 Officer, 14 men)
Company Train (17 men)
Mortar Platoon (1 Officer, 61 men)
Three Machine Gun Platoons, each (1 Officer, 35 men)
Three Rifle Companies (4 Officers, 187 men), each comprised of;
Company HQ (1 Officer, 12 men)
Company Supply Train (24 men)
Antitank Rifle Section (7 men)
Three Rifle Platoons, each comprised of;
Platoon HQ (1 Officer, 5 men)
Light Mortar Section (3 men)
Four Rifle Squads, each comprised of 10 men

Total Strength of 861 all ranks (22 Officers and 839 men)
----------------------------------

The Grenadier Battalion, late 1943
Battalion Headquarters (4 Officers, 13 men)
Communications Platoon (25 men)
Battalion Supply Train (35 men)
Machine Gun Company (3 Officers, 205 men)
Company HQ (1 Officer, 19 men)
Company Train (29 men)
Three Machine Gun Platoons, each (1 Officer or NCO, 36 men)
12 cm Mortar Platoon (1 Officer, 47 men)
Three Rifle Companies (2 Officers, 143 men), each comprised of;
Company HQ (1 Officer, 11 men)
Company Supply Train (13 men)
8 cm Mortar Section (21 men)
Three Rifle Platoons, each comprised of;
Platoon HQ (1 Officer or NCO, 5 men)
Three Rifle Squads, each comprised of 9 men

Total Strength of 720 all ranks (13 Officers and 707 men)

-------------------------
The Grenadier Battalion, circa mid-1944
Battalion Headquarters (4 Officers, 13 men)
Communications Platoon (25 men)
Battalion Supply Train (35 men)
Heavy Company (3 Officers, 202 men)
Company HQ (1 Officer, 19 men)
Company Train (17 men)
Machine Gun Platoon (1 Officer, 54 men)
8 cm Mortar Platoon (66 men)
12 cm Mortar Platoon (1 Officer, 46 men)

Three Rifle Companies (2 Officers, 140 men), each comprised of;
Company HQ (1 Officer, 11 men)
Company Supply Train (13 men)
Machine Gun Section (18 men)

Three Rifle Platoons, each comprised of;
Platoon HQ (1 Officer or NCO, 5 men)
Three Rifle Squads, each comprised of 9 men

Total Strength of 708 all ranks (13 Officers and 695 men)
---------------------

[bolas]

Jedziemy dalej ... czas na Ruskich ...

-------------------
The Rifle Battalion, circa 1941
Battalion Headquarters (4 Officers, 1 man)
Signal Platoon (1 Officer, 32 men)
Anti Tank Platoon (1 Officer, 17 men)
Supply Platoon (1 Officer, 32 men)
Medical Detachment (1 Officer, 7 men)
Machine Gun Company (4 Officers, 1 Commissar, 90 men)
Company HQ (1 Officer, 1 Commissar, 6 men)
Three Platoons, each comprised of;
1 Officer, 28 men
Mortar Company (4 Officers, 1 Commissar, 47 men)
Company HQ (1 Officer, 1 Commissar, 5 men)
Three Platoons, each comprised of;
1 Officer, 14 men
Three Rifle Companies (5 Officers, 1 Commissar, 171 men) each comprised of;
Company HQ (1 Officer, 1 Commissar, 5 men)
Medical Detachment, 5 men
Machine Gun Platoon, comprised of;
Platoon HQ (1Officer, 1 man)
Two Squads, each comprised of 5 men
Three Rifle Platoons, each comprised of;
Platoon HQ (1 Officer, 2 men)
Light Mortar Squad (4 men)
Four Rifle Squads, each comprised of 11 men

Total Strength of 775 all ranks (31 Officers, 5 Commissars and 739 men)
-------------------------------------
ROSYJSKA KOMPANIA STRZELECKA

The Rifle Company - it was the standard Rifle Company that was to see the most turbulent reforms during the war, eventually falling to levels which would barely qualify it as a Platoon.

The Squad of eleven men formed the basis of its organisation. On paper this should have been a remarkably well armed unit. It comprised an NCO with rifle, two men equipped for close combat with sub machine guns, a large rifle element of six men, all armed with rifles, and a gunner and loader for the Squad's single light machine gun. The gunner carried a pistol, the loader a rifle. The issue of two SMGs was particularly notable for the time, and it set a trend for a massive increase in the use of the weapon. The remainder of the Squad is quite pedestrian, all rifles and one LMG. What should have made the Squad special was the rifle. It was intended to be the SVT 40 semi automatic model. However, as with so much else in the Red Army, paper and fact differed radically. There were never enough of the weapons to fully arm every Squad. Instead, a handful were issued allowing perhaps the leader and a couple of men to be so armed, if that. The SVT 40, and the earlier SVT 38, were semi automatic rifles firing the standard 7.62 mm round. Unfortunately, neither proved to be a popular design, the weapon having as many flaws as it did advantages. The more common rifle was the Mosin-Nagant bolt action weapon, little changed from the design which had first appeared in the 1890's. Like all such weapons it was mostly accurate and reliable but nothing special.

The original sub machine gun was the PPD which existed in several variants. Few of these weapons were in service at the time of the invasion. Its successor was to be of far greater importance. The light machine gun was the Degtaryev DP with its visually distinctive drum magazine. The DP was a robust weapon, perfectly suited for the harsh environment of the Eastern Front.

Platoon HQ was again a basic affair, consisting of an Officer, Sergeant and runner, armed with pistol, SMG and rifle respectively. The Mortar Squad was led by an NCO, with gunner and two ammunition bearers. The mortar gunner carried a pistol, and served the Platoon's single 50 mm weapon, the remainder carried rifles. The 50 mm had an impressive range of 800 m, which should have proven very handy for a Rifle Platoon, but it was destined for a relatively short service life.

Company HQ was almost exclusively a command unit, typical of the reduced administration elements of the Red Army. The Machine Gun Platoon served a pair of Maxim weapons, identical to those in the Machine Gun Company proper.

OD 1942
The Rifle Company - the amendments made to the Rifle Company pose several questions of minute detail, but the overall effect is clear.

The basic Rifle Squad was reduced to nine men, a leader with SMG, a gunner and loader serving the DP light machine gun, and six riflemen, one acting as scout. The PPsh 41 sub machine gun was by now available in large numbers. It is sometimes referred to as a Russian Sten gun, but in reality it was a much better weapon. It fired the 7.62 mm pistol cartridge from a capacious 71 round drum magazine derived from the earlier PPD. It was as popular among the Germans who adopted so many weapons the Reich had to start producing suitable ammunition for it! As can be seen in other pages, the popularity of the 'Papa-sha' was to have a profound impact on its use.

The size of Platoon HQ is somewhat perplexing, it seems to have gained a sniper. The 50 mm mortar Platoon was reduced to three tubes, and presumably one Officer and nine men. A couple more snipers may have been present at Company level also.

At the end of 1942 several further amendments were made. The most striking again concerned the Rifle Squad. Perhaps in belated compensation for previous misdeeds, two Squads per Platoon were issued a second DP light machine gun for a total of six in the Platoon. The Platoon now also possessed two sniper rifles, but still forty men, so perhaps the runner was now reassigned. At Company level, the Mortar Platoon was reduced to seven men serving two tubes, while a four man Squad manning a Maxim type heavy machine gun were added. Some sources suggest the snipers were only present at Platoon level for a short time before being deployed with company HQ. The figures provided never quite add up.

Of more importance, the Battalion finally received its own anti tank guns, albeit the same 45 mm weapons they had started the war with. Two small Squads each served a single gun.

Overall, Battalion strength rose slightly to 612 all ranks. If only that were the end of the story...
-------------------------------
The Rifle Battalion, circa 1942
Battalion Headquarters (3 Officers, 1 Commissar)
Signal Platoon (1 Officer, 10 men)
Anti Tank Rifle Platoon (1 Officer, 22 men)
Supply Platoon (1 Officer, 11 men)
Medical Detachment (5 men)
Machine Gun Company (5 Officers, 1 Commissar, 52 men)
Company HQ (2 Officers, 1 Commissar, 1 man)
Three Platoons, each comprised of;
1 Officer, 17 men
Mortar Company (5 Officers, 1 Commissar, 55 men)
Company HQ (2 Officers, 1 Commissar, 1 man)
Three Platoons, each comprised of;
1 Officer, 18 men
Three Rifle Companies (6 Officers, 1 Commissar, 138 men) each comprised of;
Company HQ (2 Officers, 1 Commissar, 7 men)
Medical Detachment, 5 men
Mortar Platoon, comprised of;
Platoon HQ (1Officer)
Three Squads, each comprised of 3 men
Three Rifle Platoons, each comprised of;
Platoon HQ (1 Officer, 3 men)
Four Rifle Squads, each comprised of 9 men

Total Strength of 609 all ranks (33 Officers, 6 Commissars and 570 men)
------------------------------

[bolas]

Sorki za natłok angielskiego ale dane te warte są rzucenia okiem w nie. Co prawda większośc po albiońsku ale dacie radę na pewno.

Męczy mnie juz to kopiowanie więc pasuje. Chciecie więcej ?

Tu jest tego mnóstwo:
http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.com/

Wiele krajów i masa różnych szczebli taktycznych i jednostek, rodzajów broni. Piekło wręcz :)

[krzysiek]

Bolas, już by Ci kapral dał, za zatrzymywanie się i strzelanie w czasie szturmu... oj, oj, ciężkoby to było.

Każdy postój w czasie ostatniego skoku, to ryzyko zatrzymania i porażki całości. Dodatkowo Ci co siedzą w okopie na pewno będą celować w tych co stoją, a nie w tych co biegną...

Pozdrawiam
Krzysiek

[bolas]

Kolejny fajny link do poczytania o organizacji drużyn na świecie w okresie, który nas interesuje:

http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.com/Tactics/Formations/rifle_squad.htm

[MAB]

Hmmm, no to może w jednej dłoni lekki PM, a w drugiej ręce bagnet?
Wybaczcie, ale nie mogłem się powstrzymać :)
Ja oczywiście optuję za bronią automatyczną.
To siła ognia nie do przejścia.
Zresztą jak wspomniał już Michał powoli bo powoli, ale nawet w naszym WP jednak dostrzegano utratę znaczenia białej broni.
Zresztą bagnet, podobnie jak kawaleria i lance to anachronizmy, które w innych armiach znikały szybciej niż u nas.

[bolas]

Lepiej bagnet w zęby i przepaske czarną na jedno oko ;)))))))

[gros]

Przepraszam ale tabelka z danymi wysypała się.

[MarekA]

„Urywki z książki Joseph Balkoski Beyond the Beachhead: The 29th Infantry Division in Normandy" 1999 Stackpole Books.
*** Ciekawostka :) ***”
To trochę tendencyjny tekst.
„Gdy MG 42 rozpoczynał ostrzał pozostali żołnierze zajmowali się donoszeniem amunicji.”
Czyli duża szybkostrzelność MG42 powodowała, że w praktyce, przy podobnej liczebności drużyn, w drużynie amerykańskiej w walce brało udział więcej żołnierzy, niż w drużynie niemieckiej. Oznacza to, że jednocześnie drużyna amerykańska była w stanie zwalczać większą ilość celów, niż niemiecka. Karabin maszynowy mógł na raz zwalczać tylko jeden cel, najlepiej było jeśli km zwalczał cele grupowe a żołnierze pojedyncze. Amerykańska drużyna wystrzeliwała mniejszą ilość amunicji do większej ilości celów, jej ogień powinien być więc skuteczniejszy.

„Moździerze nie były celne i miały zasięg zaledwie 1 mili. ...
Dowódca kompanii niemieckiej nie miał moździerzy, a tylko dwa karabiny maszynowe MG42 w wersji ciężkiej - z trójnogiem i celownikiem optycznym - dzięki czemu mogły strzelać skutecznie nawet do celów odległych na milę.”
Czyli ... amerykański dowódca miał możliwość zwalczania celów w odległości zaledwie mili, niemiecki nawet z odległości mili. Trudno o bardziej obiektywne stwierdzenie. Ponadto, przy strzelaniu na milę, wątpię by ogień km-ów był skuteczniejszy od ognia moździerzy. Przed ogniem km-ów chroni nawet niewielkie wzniesienie, przed ogniem z moździerzy nie.

[Cwaniak]

Odnośnie ilości ludzi w drużynie wydaje mi się, że 19 ludzi w drużynie polskiej '39 to przesada, możliwe, że zakładano, że jest to kadrówka, albo też przewidywano 50 % strat w pierwszym boju.
Z mojego doświadczenia przewodzenia różnym grupom ludzi wynika, że optymalną ilością jest 6-10 osób z hakiem. Jest to ilość, którą da się ogarnąć" i wzrokiem, i głosem, i pamięcią. Zresztą, gdzieś były takie zalecenia odnośnie organizowania grup np. turystycznych. 20 (19) osób to czereda, hałastra nie do opanowania, każdy ma swoje zdanie i zadanie, kogoś zawsze nie ma. Nawet jeśli się ich osobiście wszystkich zna. A co tu mówić o żołnierzach z mobilizacji powszechnej, których własciwie łączyło tylko jedno (z kobiecego punktu widzenia)...
W pułkach kawalerii było trochę inaczej - sekcja (odpowiednik drużyny w piechocie) liczyła bodajże 6 ułanów, i odsetek mobilizowanych rezerwistów był mniejszy.

[Gebhardt]

Widze ze mnie Bolas wyreczyl w podaniu wczesnej organizacji niemieckiej - dzieki:) . Balkoski najwyrazniej jeszcze wierzy ze ogien z kb jest skuteczny. W praktyce efekt amerykanskiej organizacji byl taki ze mozna bylo strzelac do jednego celu mmniej skutecznie (rkm) i zarazem w efekcie marnowac amunicje (kb) by w koncu nie moc zwalczac niczego bo konczyla sie amunicja. Sekcja niemiecka zwalczala jeden cel ale za to skuteczniej i dluzej. Na szczescie to wlasnie Amerykanie przeprowadzili gruntowne studia tego zagadnienia. The proof of the pudding is in the eating jak mowia Anglicy, i dlatego Amerykanie do dzis dnia uzywaja gpmg tak samo jak zreszta chyba prawie caly swiat!

Co do kawalerii zmotoryzowanej to sekcje (nie druzyny) byly po prostu zwyklym przeniesieniem organizacji konnej na ciezarowki raczej niz wynik jakichs rozwazan taktycznych! Roznic miedzy 10BK i WBP-M prawie na pewno nie bylo. Pluton przemieszczal sie na 2 samochodach ciezarowych (albo jeden samochod ciezarowy z 4-kolowa przyczepa osobowa) plus motocyklu. Skladal sie z dcy i zastepcy na motocylku z koszem, gonca pieszego i obserwatora w kabinach i 4 sekcji, po dwie na ciezarowke. 3 sekcje mialy rkm i jedna sekcja byla sekcja liniowa (strzelecka) (mozliwe ze jezeli byl, to do tej sekcji przydzielano kbppanc). Jest mozliwe ze w niektorych jednostkach zmieniono organizacje 4-sekcyjna and 3-sekcyjna a 7 strzelcow + celowniczy rkm (oczywiscie cyfry globalne pozostaja takie same). Do tych konkluzji doszlem studiujac relacje, spisy osobowe itd. Dodatkowo szwadron/kompania zmotoryzowana miala organiczny polpluton ckm skladajacy sie z 15 ludzi (dca plus + dwa km + 2 kierowcow).

[Gebhardt]

Aha, i tym bagnetem to bez przesady - juz w okresie napoleonskim jesli chodzi o faktyczne zadawanie ran to bagnet byl na marginesie nawet gdy odbywala sie 'walka wrecz' i raczej o tym wszyscy wiedzieli. Za to trafienie w dziesiatke to jest aspekt morale - chodzi dokladnie o lepsze samopoczucie zolnierza ktory wiedzial ze moze w ostatecznym rozliczeniu jednak liczyc na swoja przewage jezeli jakims cudem starcie wrecz nastapi i przez to bedzie bronil sie dluzej lub parl w szturmie pewniej.

Omijalem ten topic jak moglem ale sie nie moge oprzec wreszcie mimo ze bede zaraz posadzony o jakiegos niemco-fila ktorym na pewno nie jestem! Istnieje duze nieporozumienie o rzekomej 'wyzszosci' polskiego zolnierza nad niemieckim w walce na bliska odleglosc i udowadnia sie to rzekomymi sukcesami polskich natarc. Rzeczywistosc jest troche inna. Wg zalozen taktycznych niemieckich (nie mowimy to o retoryce pana AH!) gdy nieprzyjaciel przeszedl zapore ogniowa i dochodzil na odleglosc szturmowa, niemieckie oddzialy pierwszoliniowe, o ile to bylo tylko mozliwe, splywaly na dalsza linie oporu a w to miejsce kierowaly z gory obliczony a nierzadko wstrzelany ogien mozdzierzy i artylerii by dopiero powrocic do przeciwnatarcie gdy artylerii gruntownie przetrzepala ten punkt. Do znudzenia mozna czytac w polskich relacjach opisy zajecia punktow kosztem krwawych strat w natarciu ktore po niecalej godzinie trzeba bylo opuszczac ze wzgledu na ciezar ognia artyleryjskiego. Oczywiscie gdy oddzial niemiecki nie zdazyl splynac na czas to ginal poniewaz w Wehrmachcie zaniechano szermierki na bagnety. Gdy licza sie cwierc-sekundy i stan psychiczny to ten ktory dziala na zasadzie automatycznego refleksu ma zdecydowana przewage. Ale to juz inna para kaloszy!

[michalmiazga]

Co do niemieckiego zwyczaju uciekania" przed polskimi bagnetami to pełna zgoda. Było to działanie jak najbardziej racjonalne i z góry zaplanowane w regulaminach. Po prostu mając dużą przewagę ognia nie warto poświęcać żołnierzy w walce wręcz.
Mam jednak pewne wątpliwości co do przewagi drużyny niemieckiej nad amerykańską. Czyż niemiecka drużyna nie jest łatwiejsza do zniszczenia, jeśli większość jej siły ognia opiera się na jednym MG? Ten strzelający ogniem ciągłym MG wydaje się być stosunkowo łatwy do zlokalizowania, a wtedy stosunkowo łatwo go zniszczyć, obezwładnić lub zmusić do zmiany pozycji. Odwrotnie u Amerykanów. Ogień wylotowy BAR'a zapewne łatwo pomylić z szybko strzelającymi M-1 (samopowtarzalne). Co więcej, jeśli nawet BAR zostanie zlotalizowany i obezwładniony to drużyna nadal ma sporą siłę ogniową (2-3 razy większa od drużyny niemieckiej bez MG).
Nie jestem także przekonany argumentem, że strzelec kb z powodu stresu nie jest w stanie celować. Czyż strzelec BAR'a lub MG nie podlegał tym samym stresom? Co więcej, strzelając z broni maszynowej łatwiej puszczać w powietrze całe magazynki i taśmy bez określonego celu (mówiąc bardziej elegancko - strzelając do pola a nie do punktu). Wiadome jest też, że ogień pojedyńczy jest dużo celniejszy niż ogień seriami. W sumie wiec celność statystycznej kuli wystrzelonej z kb powinna być większa niż kuli z km.
Jeśli więc drużyna niemiecka i drużyna amerykańska miały do dyspozycji tą samą ilość amunicji to przewagę skuteczności ognia (liczoną jako ilość trafień) powinni mieć amerykanie.

[Gebhardt]

Strzelajac do tarczy na poligonie oczywiscie tak. Ale.... problem nie lezy w niemoznosci celowania - wrecz odwrotnie. Pod wplywem ekstremalnych emocji wylacza sie do pewnego stopnia czesc mozgu myslaca i dominuja inne czesci dzialajace instynktownie czy, jak kto woli, szablonowo. W tej czesci mozgu jest, u normalnego czlowieka (98%), 'wired in' ze sie nie zabija innych ludzi. Innymi slowy duzo latwiej jest zabic w zimnej krwi niz pod dzialaniem stresu. Pozostale 2%, polowa to pospolici psychopaci (czasami pozyteczni na polu walki ale rownie niebezpieczni dla wlasnej strony jak dla npla!) oraz wyjatkowi ludzie (Amerykanie nazywaja ich 'naturalnymi wojownikami') ktorzy potrafia przezwyciezyc instynkt. Na ogol w gre wchodzi tutaj swoistego rodzaju altruizm - dzialaja w obronie kolegow.

Michale - uderzyles w sedno sprawy piszac o strzelaniu do pola a nie do celu. Wlasnie uderzajace jest to ze strzelec z kb 2WS tez strzelal do pola a nie do celu. Stad jego prawie zerowa skutecznosc w zadawaniu strat i kompletna dominacja w tym polu broni maszynowej a tym bardziej artylerii.

Po wojnie w treningu US army widac rosnacy nacisk na systemy treningu psychologiczne ktorych zadaniem jest wlasnie przetworzenie normalnych smiertelnikow na 'naturalnych wojownikow'. Chodzi tu o wprowadzenie strzelania do celu do dzialania szablonowego - takie same zadanie ma cwiczenie szermierki bagnetem. Pod wieloma wzgledami to sie im udaje coraz lepiej - niestety jest koszt. Naturalny wojownik z urodzenia na ogol nie ponosi szkody psychologicznej. Naturalny wojownik wyprodukowany, skonfrontowany z efektami swoich zabujczych akcji czesto ponosi dlugotrwale psychologiczne urazy. Tak wiec widac w dzialanich US armii po 2WS rsonaca efektywnosc ognia indywidualnego ale i rowniez rosnacy odsetek weteranow z powaznymi zaburzeniami psychologicznymi.

Jak widac obie armie - niemiecka juz podczas 2 WS a Amerykanska niedlugo po, zeszly sie w srodku. US army wprowadzila gpmg i karabiny szturmowe, niemcy wprowadzili sturmy.

To chyba wyjasnia moj punkt widzenia.

[michalmiazga]

Hymmm
Muszę przyznać, że podana eoria stresu" jest dla mnie dość zaskakująca. Zawsze mi się wydawało, że jak człowiek działa instynktownie to po prostu walczy o byt i nie przebiera w środkach. Czyż w walce naczelną (instynktowną) zasadą nie jest albo ja jego, albo on mnie"?

Nawet jednak przyjmując tą teorię to nie tłumaczy ona dlaczego statystyczna kula z kb miałaby być mniej celna od kuli z km.

Czy nie jest po prostu tak, że w walce stres powoduje że celność wszystkich strzelców spada. Zarówno strzelców km jak i kb.

[bolas]

A coż to jest to gpmg" bo nie obejmuje tego ;) ? Jakieś mg" ale jakie ... ?

[krzysiek]

Zapewne General Purpose. :)

Bardzo ciekawe jest to co piszecie o taktyce niemieckiej w 1939 roku. Wiem, że taka była w 1944, ale myślałem, że w 1939 była bardziej zbliżona do polskiej, coś w rodzaju ozstrzygnąć szturm w walce wręcz". W opisach z 1944 roku wręcz jest niezwykle ciekawe właśnie taka sekwencja: włamanie - artyleria - uderzenie odwodów.

Trzeba jednak przyznać, że jest to taktyka bardzo ryzykowna w przypadku bardzo dużej przewagi przeciwnika.

Kilka razy zapadły mi w pamięć opisy niemieckie mówiące o ilości zabitych polskich żołnierzy po nieudanych szturmach coś w rodzaju przypominało to I wojnę światową".

Pozdrawiam
Krzysiek

[Gebhardt]

GPMG = general purpose machine gun (km ogolnego zastosowania) - okreslenie ogolnikowe opisujace km ktory przy zastosowaniu odpowiedniej podstawy/przyborow moze byc zastosowany jako lkm, ckm, km czolgowy etc. Niemiecki MG38 na ogol jest uwazany za pierwszy km tego rodzaju.

Michale - na temat dzialania psychologicznego pola walki jest, oczywiscie, sporo literatury fachowej. Nie udaje ze to moja dzialka, ale teza ktora przedstawiam jest dominujaca podstawa nowoczesnego treningu US army i BA (o innych nie wiem). Popieraja ja fakty znane od setek lat jak i rozlegle studia od koncowych miesiecy 2WS do dzisiaj. Za to nie ulega najmniejszej watpliwosci ze zolnierz uzbrojony w kb w IIWS strzelal 'do pola' a nie do celu. Poniewaz przez to trafienie czegos to w 98% przypadek, liczy sie wiec ilosc wystrzelonych pociskow oraz systematycznosc pokrycia terenu ogniem. Ze wzgledu na stabilnosc i szybkstrzelnosc rkm/lkm daje lepsze rezultaty niz kb, ckm juz duzo lepsze.

Dlatego rowniez, artyleria absolutnie dominuje pole walki 2WS. Dla przykladu 60% strat krwawych (a wliczone sa tu WSZYSTKIE straty - wypadki samochodowe etc tez!) BA w kampanii francuzkiej 1944 sa to straty spowodowane artyleria npla (wliczajac mozdzierze). A jest to przeciez artyleria dzialajaca w najgorszych warunkach: alianci dominuja w powietrzu, maja niezliczone i najnowsze srodki przeciwbateryjne a z drugiej strony jest staly brak amunicji i wszystkich innych srodkow zywienia walki artyleryjskiej.